

Securing Wireless Data Networks against eavesdropping using smart antennas

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Outline


- Introduction
- Scope and Background
- Motivation
- Basic Techniques and Integrated Solution
- Performance Evaluation
- Conclusion

Introduction

- **Wireless Security:**
 - Explosive growth of wireless data networks has led to increasing attention on specifically securing the wireless network
 - Wireless security solutions like WEP are dominantly cryptography based and typically extensions from their wired counterparts
- **Scope of this work :**
 - Using smart antennas to limit the knowledge of existence of information from an eavesdropper
 - A complimentary approach to cryptography based techniques

Scope and Background

- A set of APs and Eavesdroppers M
 - APs have k elements, M have up to k elements
 - M have location information of clients and APs
- Exposure Region
 - Region in which eavesdropper can decode the signal
- Smart Antenna Beamforming
 - Adaptive arrays enable amplitude and phase weighting to obtain large set of antenna patterns
 - A k -element array at the transmitter (receiver) can place $k-1$ nulls in its pattern and control where it causes (receives) interference
 - When more than k parallel transmissions happen within an interference range, all transmissions become undecodable



Motivation

- Why not just cryptography?
 - Actual solutions are not as secure as the core cryptographic scheme due to Implementation flaws, inability to realize true random numbers
 - Several unique privacy and targeted Denial of Service attacks due to the wireless channel not addressed by cryptography
 - Passive attacks like user fingerprinting * and active attacks like beacon attacks
- Why not just Line Of Sight beamforming?
 - Diminishing benefits with indoor fading, number of elements
 - Cannot handle non-contiguous security regions
 - Sub-linear exposure region with number of elements
- *Can an intelligent scheme achieve larger security benefits?*

Virtual Array of Physical Arrays


- Setting

- Enterprise WLAN with central controller that coordinates decisions of p APs (Virtual array)
- Each AP has a k element array (physical array)

- Basic strategies


- Information deprivation – prevent eavesdropper from getting access to the required information/signal
 - Secret sharing
- Information Overloading – overload eavesdropper with more signals than it can sustain
 - Controlled jamming
 - Stream Overwhelming

Secret Sharing



- Idea:
 - Create t shares of the message such that all shares are required for decoding the message
 - Transmit the shares through different APs by leveraging the high density of access points reachable from each client
 - While client receives all shares, eavesdropper does not receive all shares and cannot decode the message


Controlled Jamming



- Idea:



- Use the available Degrees of Freedom (elements) at an AP to jam areas in the network except around the desired clients
- APs suppress interference to desired clients by adapting their beams
- Use in conjunction with the maximum allowed power to prevent access in locations without authorized clients
- Eavesdropper needs to suppress interference from each element of the active APs ($p \cdot k$) in the vicinity to thwart this scheme

Stream Overwhelming



- Idea:
 - Choose AP- client pairs such that overlap of the data streams causes poor decodability
 - Except around the clients, many other areas are overwhelmed
 - APs exploit transmit side interference suppression to protect clients whereas the eavesdropper is overloaded
 - Eavesdropper overloaded by coordinating data transmissions (as opposed to transmitting jamming signals in the previous case)

Integrated Operations



■ Architecture

- Central controller which controls transmission of each AP
- Transmissions are synchronized
- Downstream and upstream communication alternate in epochs
- Controller knows the location of APs and approximate location of clients


■ Operation

- For a given throughput constraint, if security is to be maximized,
- *A combination of stream overwhelming and secret sharing (with preference to secret sharing) should be used,*
- *The remaining APs devoted to controlled jamming*


Algorithms and Implementation

- Two cascaded schedulers
 - Throughput scheduler
 - Input: S parameter, connectivity matrix, packet sequence
 - Output: S' In-sequence packets out of the first S packets
 - For each AP determine the number of clients in the stream
 - Greedily assign packets in-sequence by assigning the client to the AP with minimum APs
 - Update the APs and the Degrees of Freedom
 - Security Scheduler
 - Input: S' , packet sequence, connectivity matrix
 - Output: Action for each Ap in each fragment duration
 - For each fragment m and each AP determine availability
 - Sort the APs in ascending order of available fragments
 - Greedily assign APs and update the DOF
 - Adjust for stream-overwhelming
 - Assign remaining APs for controlled jamming while ensuring already assigned clients remain unaffected

Algorithm Illustration




Throughput Scheduler



AP \ timeslot	t1	t2
AP1	J	C1 ₂
AP2	C1 ₁	C2 ₂
AP3	C2 ₁	J



AP-client association



Performance Evaluation



- Custom simulator in C++
 - Adaptive beamforming with interference suppression
 - Channel modelling
 - ITU Indoor attenuation model with a path loss exponent of 4 and lognormal fading with a standard deviation of 2.5dB
 - Link fade margin of 3dB with operating frequency of 2.4 GHz
 - SNR threshold of 15dB
 - Noise floor of -100 dBm, Rx. sensitivity of -85 dBm
 - Transmission power of 20dBm
 - Random position of clients, eavesdropper and APs in a 100m * 100m grid
 - Default values of 20 clients, 4 APs, 4 array elements
 - Downstream flows to a random subset of clients
 - Metric: Average Exposure region

Performance Evaluation (1/2)



- With increasing k ,
 - Beamforming security gives diminishing returns
 - Integrated algorithm provides large reduction in security with an example exposure region of 1% with just 2 elements and 2 APs.
- With increasing p ,
 - Improvements are much larger because of the large secret sharing possibilities
 - With 4 elements and 4 APs, exposure region reduced to 0.01%

Performance Evaluation (2/2)



- Throughput is preserved by the algorithm due to intelligent use of resources
- Eavesdropper collusion affects the integrated algorithm to a much smaller extent when compared to omnidirectional and beamforming
- Slight increase of exposure probability (but less than 10%) when the number of colluding eavesdroppers is increased upto 25

Conclusion

- Summary

- introduced the idea of using spatial smartness to provide security against eavesdropping
- presented three novel mechanisms that fundamentally improve security against eavesdropping
- evaluated the performance of an integrated algorithm that uses the three mechanisms in tandem, using simulations

- Future work

- Implement the solutions in an actual environment with appropriate prototypes
- Study the details of the beamforming algorithm in indoor settings considering complexity
- Study the security vs throughput trade-off in detail

Thank You



For further details:

[www.ece.gatech.edu/research/GNAN
/archive/2008/icdcs08a.html](http://www.ece.gatech.edu/research/GNAN/archive/2008/icdcs08a.html)

Email feedback/comments to:
sriram@ece.gatech.edu

Performance Evaluation - backup

- When rate parameter is changed, the exposure region slightly increases and then decreases since as S increases both the number of packets scheduled and the possibility of separated clients increases.
- When the number of APs is increased, the integrated algorithm gives increased benefits which saturate when possible spatial reuse in the network is exhausted.



Difference between cryptography and smartsec


- Encryption

- Disclosing the signal
- Hiding the message in the signal
- Data-link layer or above
- Relies on computational complexity
- Cannot prevent unique security attacks due to wireless broadcast nature such as fingerprinting

- Our approach

- Hiding the signal
- Physical or MAC layer
- Smart antennas
- Relies on spatial and channel conditions which are less controllable by eavesdropper

TCP/IP protocol suite



Quantitative Results

Strategies	Exposure region (m ²)
Omni-directional	1725.46
Beam-forming	855.69
Secret Sharing	146.55
Controlled Jamming	23.74
Stream Overwhelming	232.86
Integrated	5.69

Simulation Parameters

Max tx power	20dBm
Sensibility	-85dBm
Noise	-100dBm
SINR threshold	15dB
Frequency	2.4GHz
Path loss factor	4
Link margin	3.2 dB
Number of APs	4
Number of elements	4

All or Nothing encryption

- Procedure such that all shares must be recovered to recover the message else there is no information disclosure
- Developed by R.L.Rivest
- Lecture Notes in Computer science, volume 1267, issue 210, 1997
- Involves xoring the fragments each of which is X bits by dividing the total packet into fragments of size X bits

Why 3 schemes

- There are two flavours of approaches namely deprivation and overload
- For these, capacity preserving and capacity sacrificing techniques can be found
- While deprivation leads to directly a capacity preserving scheme such as secret sharing
- Overload has two flavours to adapt to network conditions
- The controlled jamming and stream overwhelming are the 'extreme' techniques in the range of overload techniques
- Thus for flexibility we include 3 schemes